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What Butler Did
Michael Plaxton*
I. INTRODUCTION: THE OBJECTIFICATION FAMILY
When Parliament amended the Criminal Code1 in 1983, replacing the
language of rape with that of sexual assault, it was first and foremost to
underscore the fact that non-consensual sexual touching is not a crime of
sex, but a crime of violence.2 By treating this behaviour as a species of
assault, rather than an innocent male lapse of self-control, Parliament
hoped to transform social attitudes to women, women’s bodies and their
sexual autonomy.3 In R. v. Ewanchuk,4 Major J. made a number of
remarks tending to emphasize what sexual assault has in common with
other forms of assault:
Society is committed to protecting the personal integrity, both physical
and psychological, of every individual. Having control over who
touches one’s body, and how, lies at the core of human dignity and
autonomy. The inclusion of assault and sexual assault in the Code
expresses society’s determination to protect the security of the person
from any non-consensual contact or threats of force. The common law
has recognized for centuries that the individual’s right to physical
integrity is a fundamental principle ... It follows that any intentional but
unwanted touching is criminal.5

At the same time, it has always been clear that sexual assault is a
unique form of violence, and does not target precisely the same wrongs
as other assault offences. Justice Cory acknowledged the offence’s
unique nature in R. v. Osolin, observing that it assaults human dignity

*
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anonymous reviewers for their comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.
1
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
2
See Susan Brownmiller, Against Our Will: Men, Women, and Rape (New York: Bantam,
1975); Christine Boyle, Sexual Assault (Toronto: Carswell, 1984).
3
See R. v. Osolin, [1993] S.C.J. No. 135, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 595 at para. 165 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Osolin”].
4
R. v. Ewanchuk, [1999] S.C.J. No. 10, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 330 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ewanchuk”].
5
Id., at para. 28.
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and denies gender equality.6 The evidentiary reforms to the law of sexual
assault, the Supreme Court agreed in Seaboyer, reflected the need to
combat gender myths and stereotypes.7 In Ewanchuk, the Court narrowed
the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent in recognition of
widespread myths and stereotypes about women — namely, that they are
“passive, disposed submissively to surrender to the sexual advances of
active men”.8 The ruling implicitly recognizes the wrongfulness of
presuming that a woman is ready and willing to satisfy one’s own sexual
desires — of treating her as a sexual object. This theme was further
pursued in A. (J.). There, the majority noted that the consent provisions
in section 273 of the Criminal Code exist in part to prevent sexual
exploitation, and that consent must be voluntary and revocable at all
times during the sexual activity.9
The offence of sexual assault is directed at violence, then, but it is
directed at something else as well: objectification.10 I may assault a
person — for example, by engaging him in a bar-room fistfight —
without treating him as an object in anything like the way that nonconsensual sexual touching would. For that reason, we can and do
distinguish between common assault and sexual assault. But the fact that
sexual assault targets objectifying behaviour is important not just because
it drives a wedge between it and other kinds of assault: it also establishes
a familial tie with a range of offences that do not target assault at all. In
particular, it establishes a genetic link with provisions criminalizing
public indecency and the publication of obscene materials.11
Thinking about sexual assault as part of a family of objectificationtargeting offences leads us to consider with fresh eyes two important
Supreme Court of Canada decisions: R. v. Butler, the landmark ruling
interpreting the Criminal Code’s obscenity provisions;12 and R. v.
Labaye, which interpreted the offence of keeping a common bawdy6

Osolin, supra, note 3, at para. 165.
R. v. Seaboyer; R. v. Gayme, [1991] S.C.J. No. 62, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Seaboyer”].
8
See David Archard, Sexual Consent (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1998), at 131, cited with
approval by L’Heureux-Dubé J. in Ewanchuk, supra, note 4, at para. 82.
9
R. v. A. (J.), [2011] S.C.J. No. 28, 2011 SCC 28, at para. 3 (S.C.C.).
10
See John Gardner & Stephen Shute, “The Wrongness of Rape” [hereinafter “Gardner &
Shute”] in Jeremy Horder, ed., Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, Fourth Series (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2000), at 204. The paper has been reproduced in John Gardner, Offences and
Defences: Essays in the Philosophy of Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
Citations will be to the original.
11
See Criminal Code, ss. 173, 163(8).
12
[1992] S.C.J. No. 15, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Butler”].
7

(2012), 57 S.C.L.R. (2d)

WHAT BUTLER DID

319

house for the practice of acts of indecency.13 In both cases, the Court
placed the concept of harm at the heart of its analysis. In Butler, the
Court held that section 163 of the Criminal Code targets pornographic
materials that harm society. The degrading or dehumanizing nature of
such materials was not treated as significant in and of itself, but only
insofar as it gave rise to the inference that they would meet that test of
harmfulness. Likewise, a majority of the Court in Labaye held that the
offence of criminal indecency requires proof that the conduct in question
causes harm of a nature contrary to “norms which our society has
recognized in its Constitution or similar fundamental laws”.14 Furthermore, “the harm must not only detract from proper societal functioning,
but must be incompatible with it”.15
In this brief paper, I want to argue that the focus on harm in Butler
and Labaye can distort our thinking about what precisely is wrong with
sexual assault. They obscure the message that certain kinds of objectification are per se wrongful, whether or not we can point to any tangible
harm. Perhaps more importantly, these cases fail to provide the sort of
sophisticated analysis of what makes conduct problematically objectifying in the first place. Even if these shortcomings produce no discernible
effect on the way that courts decide particular cases before them, it
undermines the educative function of the criminal law. This is especially
problematic in the context of sexual assault, where the law must not only
reflect social values, but also take a leadership role in transforming them.
This paper is divided into three sections. Part II considers Gardner
and Shute’s account of rape as directed against the wrong of objectification — and, specifically, the wrong of treating another as a mere sexual
instrument, whether or not any tangible harm flows from it, and the
significance of consent to the analysis. Part III considers the Butler
decision. We will see that the Supreme Court in Butler focused on the
harm caused by the publication of objectifying materials. Furthermore,
although the decision was driven by concerns about objectification, the
Court failed to articulate just what it is about objectification that makes it
morally problematic, and failed to say how we can identify morally
troubling depictions of objectification when we see them. This contributed to later confusion concerning the role of consent in the objectification analysis. Finally, Part IV examines the Supreme Court’s majority
13
14
15

[2005] S.C.J. No. 83, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 728 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Labaye”].
Id., at para. 29.
Id. (original emphasis).
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opinion in Labaye. We will see that this decision both followed (and
arguably extended) the reasoning in Butler, placing harm at the centre of
the inquiry. More importantly for our purposes here, the majority in
Labaye failed to raise a number of considerations that should have been
relevant to the objectification inquiry and, critically, appeared confused
about the significance of consent.

II. OBJECTIFICATION, INSTRUMENTALIZATION AND CONSENT
In their important paper, “The Wrongness of Rape”, John Gardner
and Stephen Shute present a thought experiment — what they describe as
“the pure case of rape”.16 In that thought experiment, they imagine a
woman who is penetrated while she is fast asleep or unconscious. She
suffers no physical injuries and, because she never learns that she has
been assaulted, no psychological injuries either. The offender is killed by
a passing bus, making it impossible for anyone ever to discover what he
did. Afterwards, the victim lives her life as if nothing had happened — as
far as she knows, nothing has happened. It is, for that reason, difficult to
say that the victim has sustained, in any straightforward sense, any harm
at all. Yet most of us would nonetheless agree that she has been seriously
wronged.17 That suggests that, although rape is typically accompanied by
physical and psychological harms to the victim, those harms are not what
make rape wrongful. Even in a situation where there is no physical or
psychological harm, rape — and, by extension, sexual assault — intuitively strikes us as a profound moral wrong. Sexual assault is not wrong
because its victims are frequently traumatized by it; when, in the real
world, they are traumatized by it, it is because of the wrong done to
them.
What makes rape wrongful, according to Gardner and Shute, is the
fact that it treats the victim as a mere instrument — a thing to be used.18
In focusing on instrumentalization, they were following the lead of
Martha Nussbaum, whose analysis of objectification remains the most
sophisticated treatment of the subject.19 Nussbaum argued that objectifi16

Gardner & Shute, supra, note 10, at 196.
But see Douglas Husak, “Gardner on the Philosophy of Criminal Law” (2009) 29
O.J.L.S. 169, at 184-85.
18
Gardner & Shute, supra, note 10, at 204.
19
Martha Nussbaum, “Objectification” (1995) 24 Phil. & Pub. Affairs 249 [hereinafter
“Nussbaum”]. The paper has been reproduced in her collection, Sex and Social Justice (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2000). All references will be to the original citation.
17
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cation can take a number of forms. It may entail treating another person
as an inert thing; as non-autonomous; as fungible with other people, or
with inanimate objects; as violable; as lacking subjectivity; or as property
or a commodity that can be owned.20 Frequently, objectification in one
sense will entail it in some — though by no means all — other senses as
well. Importantly, though, Nussbaum makes a compelling case that
objectification in none of these senses is inherently morally problematic.21 Indeed, she argues persuasively that in some contexts objectification can be benign and even positive.22 It is when objectification takes
the form of instrumentalization that we will be most ready to conclude
that it is pernicious.23 This is not to say, however, that we should ignore
the other ways in which conduct can objectify: instrumentalizing conduct
will invariably be objectifying in several or all of the senses Nussbaum
catalogues. When we see one form of objectification, we should be alert
to the possibility that we are in treacherous moral waters.
As the above suggests, the objectification inquiry is highly contextdriven.24 The significance of context, moreover, does not end once we
conclude that conduct is instrumentalizing. Even instrumentalizing
conduct can be rendered morally unproblematic in the presence of
consent. Thus, Nussbaum refers to the use she might make of her partner
as a pillow — instrumentalizing behaviour that is made untroubling by
her partner’s consent.25 Moreover, even if consent does not have that
effect, our respect for sexual autonomy will often lead us to allow
consenting adults to engage in problematically objectifying behaviour.
The consent that a streetwalker gives to her john does not remove the
moral qualms we may have about their “transaction” — this strikes us as
objectifying in deeply troubling ways — but our respect for the prostitute’s sexual autonomy arguably gives us a good reason to permit it
nevertheless.26

20

Id., at 257.
Id., at 274.
22
Id.
23
Id., at 265.
24
Id., at 271.
25
Id., at 265. For a discussion of this, see Patricia Marino, “The Ethics of Sexual Objectification: Autonomy and Consent” (2008) 51 Inquiry 345; Lina Papadaki, “What is Objectification?”
(2010) 7 J. Moral Phil. 16; Paul Voice, “Martha’s Pillow: Nussbaum on Justice and Sex” (2002) 15
Social Just. Res. 185.
26
See Gardner & Shute, supra, note 10, at 206-209; Martha Nussbaum, “‘Whether from
Reason or Prejudice’: Taking Money for Bodily Services” (1998) 27 J. Legal Stud. 693 [hereinafter
“Nussbaum, ‘Bodily Services’”].
21
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What is striking about Gardner and Shute’s pure case of rape is that it
forces us to ask why we think the presence or absence of consent matters.
Consent, we may intuit, can make otherwise wrongful behaviour morally
okay, or it can effectively license courses of action that are still wrongful
but to which responsible moral agents should be allowed to subject
themselves. On either view, the consent inquiry represents the last stage
in the moral analysis. Before we get to that point, though, we need to
determine whether there is any moral work for consent to do. And
Gardner and Shute’s thought experiment reveals that a focus on harm can
mislead us.
Why worry about it? So long as we know whether there is consent,
one could argue, we seem to have enough information to know whether it
is appropriate to impose criminal liability on the objectifying party. Why
bother to ask whether the objectification is of one sort rather than
another, if questions of liability will get settled at the consent stage of
reasoning anyway?
There are a few responses to this objection. First, the nature of the
objectification will occasionally determine whether consent should be
treated as an answer to the allegations in question. Some forms of
instrumentalization may seem to us so profoundly dehumanizing and
degrading that we will conclude that one cannot legally consent to them.
For example, though without purporting to settle the matter, certain
sadomasochistic practices may well reach a degree of violence that we
reject them as valid expressions of intimacy.27 But to know whether there
is anything in a given set of sexual practices that is valuable and worth
preserving, we first need to carefully scrutinize them. Just asking
whether there was consent is not enough.
Second, there is a value in determining just why consent matters in a
given case. We have seen that consent may work a kind of “moral
magic”,28 transforming otherwise wrongful courses of action into
salutary ones. It may, however, only serve to license acts that, though
legally permissible, remain wrongful. The distinction is hardly arid and
academic: it is the difference between looking approvingly or fondly
upon an intimate practice or behaviour (e.g., the treatment of a lover’s
stomach as a pillow) or grudgingly tolerating a practice that we see as
essentially pernicious (e.g., prostitution). When we fail to explain with
27

See R. v. Brown, [1993] 2 All E.R. 75.
I borrow the phrase from Heidi Hurd, “The Moral Magic of Consent” (1996) 2 Legal
Theory 121.
28
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precision how a given practice instrumentalizes a person, and how
consent affects its lawfulness, we wind up lumping all sexual practices
together. This risks sending the message that if one instrumentalizing
sexual practice deserves praise, then they all do; that if one kind of
instrumentalizing sexual expression deserves criticism (if not criminal
punishment), then they all must. We should be wary of inadvertently
criticizing, and driving people away from, perfectly legitimate displays
of intimacy and warmth. Likewise, we should be deeply concerned at the
prospect of encouraging, accidentally as it were, sexual practices that
strike us as brutal, but which we have led members of the public to
conclude are fundamentally indistinguishable from the acts of love often
undertaken by loving partners.
The second point ties closely into my third: the purpose of the criminal law is, first and foremost, to educate the public — to guide them
away from wrongful courses of action even while it preserves positive
social practices. That educative function is largely performed by Parliament — by its determination that some practices are wrongful whereas
some are not. But the courts, by determining and articulating which
courses of action are sanctionable, may have their own role to play. In
explaining why some kinds of behaviour deserve criminal sanction, and
some do not, the courts effectively send a message about what tolerance
entails in a liberal democratic society; about the extent to which we
should permit behaviour that offends our liberal sensibilities, and the
point at which our commitment to liberalism requires us to categorically
condemn it. In making this observation, I am to a degree taking issue
with Meir Dan-Cohen’s thesis that the law should, or anyway does,
encourage acoustic separation in the criminal law; that the public need
not be informed about decision rules (frequently court-created) setting
out the circumstances under which sanctions will be imposed, even if
they must be informed about the kinds of conduct prohibited by Parliament.29 Even acknowledging that there may be important advantages in
having the substantive criminal law articulate different, parallel norms to
citizens and legal officials — particularly in dissuading members of the
public from using decision rules to “game” the law — we should note
some of the costs of doing so, particularly where we want the law to take,
as it were, a leadership role in changing social attitudes.

29
Meir Dan-Cohen, “Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: Acoustic Separation in the Criminal Law” (1984) 94 Harv. L. Rev. 625.
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III. BUTLER, OBJECTIFICATION AND HARM
In Butler, the Supreme Court was called upon to decide whether section 163(8) of the Criminal Code is consistent with section 2(b) of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.30 The impugned provision
states: “For the purposes of this Act, any publication a dominant characteristic of which is the undue exploitation of sex, or of sex and any one or
more of the following subjects, namely, crime, horror, cruelty and
violence, shall be deemed to be obscene.” The Court paid particular
attention to “the undue exploitation of sex”. In determining whether
materials are obscene in that sense, the Court appeared to suggest that we
should look to community standards of tolerance — the test first enunciated in R. v. Brodie31 and later endorsed in R. v. Towne Cinema Theatres
Ltd.32 It acknowledged, though, that uncertainty had accumulated around
the community standards test. In Towne Cinema, Dickson C.J.C. remarked that the degrading or dehumanizing nature of materials could be
treated as a “principal indicator of ‘undueness’”.33 The question was
whether this was an independent and freestanding test of obscenity, or
whether the degrading or dehumanizing nature of the materials in
question necessarily means that they fall outside community standards of
tolerance.34
The Court in Butler adopted the latter understanding. Justice
Sopinka, writing for the Court, found that material would offend community standards where it was shown that it predisposed persons to act in
an anti-social fashion. He stated:
The courts must determine as best they can what the community would
tolerate others being exposed to on the basis of the degree of harm that
may flow from such exposure. Harm in this context means that it
predisposes persons to act in an anti-social manner as, for example, the
physical or mental mistreatment of women by men, or, what is perhaps
debatable, the reverse. Anti-social conduct for this purpose is conduct
which society formally recognizes as incompatible with its proper
functioning. The stronger the inference of a risk of harm the lesser the
likelihood of tolerance.35
30
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
31
[1962] S.C.J. No. 55, [1962] S.C.R. 681 (S.C.C.).
32
[1985] S.C.J. No. 24, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 494 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Towne Cinema”].
33
Butler, supra, note 12, at 480, citing Towne Cinema, id., at 505.
34
Butler, id., at 483.
35
Id., at 485.
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Degrading or dehumanizing materials would frequently, though not
invariably, cause this sort of harm to the community.36 In a sense, then,
the dissenting judges in Labaye were right when they argued that the
Butler Court made reference to harm only to conceptually link the
community standards test to the degrading or dehumanizing treatment
test.37 This would seem to suggest that the community standards test
might be satisfied in cases where the impugned materials are not degrading or dehumanizing or cause no harm at all, but are simply contrary to
popular notions of sexual morality. The mere fact that degrading or
dehumanizing works necessarily transgress community standards does
not, after all, mean that community standards are offended only by those
works — there is room for a residual category. The Labaye dissent
argued on this basis that nothing in Butler displaced the community
standards test for obscenity.38
The Butler Court’s use of the idea of harm, though, went much further than this. Justice Sopinka rested his decision on the propositions that
certain kinds of pornography are neither degrading nor dehumanizing,
and that certain kinds of degrading or dehumanizing pornography might
nonetheless be harmless.39 It would not be open to a judge to declare
such materials “obscene” for the purposes of section 163(8) of the
Criminal Code, merely because they offend his or her individual sensibilities or taste. There must be an “intelligible standard”.40 The harm test
was meant to provide a non-subjective basis for deciding obscenity
cases. It would have been pointless to articulate such a test while
simultaneously recognizing a residual category. Moreover, the provision
was saved under section 1 of the Charter precisely because it targeted
material that “reinforce[d] ... unhealthy tendencies in Canadian society”
and “male-female stereotypes to the detriment of both sexes.”41 To say
that the provision’s objective was to prevent harm to society, but concede
that it also criminalized the publication of harmless materials, would be
tantamount to saying that the subsection is overbroad.
After Butler, then, harm was not only a relevant or dominant feature
of the community standards analysis; it effectively supplanted that
36

Id., at 496-97.
Labaye, supra, note 13, at para. 93.
38
Id., at para. 97. See also Brenda Cossman et al., Bad Attitudes on Trial: Pornography,
Feminism, and the Butler Decision (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), at 50.
39
Butler, supra, note 12, at 505.
40
Id., at 490-91.
41
House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs, Report on Pornography (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1978), at 18:4, cited with approval in Butler, id., at 493.
37
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analysis. And yet there was still a point of ambiguity. As we have seen,
the Court used the concept of harm to establish a bridge between the
community standards test and the degradation or dehumanization inquiry.
The Court plainly thought that, if obscenity means anything in a liberal,
secular society like Canada, it must refer to words or pictures that, by
portraying women as things to be used for the sexual gratification of
men, fly in the face of our constitutional commitment to substantive
equality. Though the Court opted not to expressly disavow the community standards test — no doubt to avoid giving the impression that the
community standards jurisprudence had simply been swept away — it
was necessary to explain how the fact that materials are degrading or
dehumanizing matters to that inquiry. Thus, while harm dominates the
obscenity inquiry in and after Butler, the intuition that Parliament
intended to target instrumentalizing treatment — objectification in its
most morally problematic forms — is what drove the Court to refer to
harm in the first place.
Admittedly, this is not how the Court itself always frames its reasoning. At times, as in Sopinka J.’s discussion of the shifting purpose
doctrine, there seems to be a suggestion that harm, and not objectification, is the real target. But in making these claims, the Court was forced
to engage in mighty feats of mental gymnastics, arguing that because
Parliament had always targeted the corrupting influence of obscene
materials on those who consume it, it must likewise have targeted the
broader harms it produced in society.42 And in a sense an individual’s
“corruption” can be described, albeit loosely, as a kind of harm befalling
him or her. Indeed, the term evokes images of a sort of decay or rot —
think of Oscar Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian Gray,43 or of references to
“the stain of sin” in Dante’s Purgatorio.44 We speak of people (or
ourselves) being “damaged” by experiences that have nurtured attitudes
or habits of thought that, from our point of view, strike us as real,
tangible obstacles to being the sorts of people we want to be. With that in
mind, the language of “harm” does not seem altogether out of place. It
should be clear, though, that we are talking about a kind of harm very
different from that which Parliament was said to have targeted. Before
Butler, it would not have been necessary to look beyond the corrupting
influence of certain kinds of pornography upon the viewer himself. After
42

Butler, id., at 494.
Oscar Wilde, The Picture of Dorian Gray (London: Penguin, 1995 [1891]).
Dante Alighieri, The Divine Comedy – 2: Purgatory, trans. by Dorothy Sayers (London:
Penguin, 1955 [1308-20]).
43
44
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Butler, the emphasis was repositioned so that the impact on the viewer
was significant only insofar as it gave rise to a significant risk that others
in the wider community would ultimately suffer harm of their own.
Though objectification provided the impetus for introducing harm to the
analysis, Butler drew the eye away from it.
Here, we should be careful, if only in the interests of fairness. Butler
does not stand for the proposition that some kinds of objectifying
attitudes are okay whereas others are not. It only says that the criminal
sanction should be limited to cases in which there is a significant risk
that exposure to pornographic materials will give rise to anti-social
behaviour or attitudes. One can, with no inconsistency, say that the
publication of some objectifying materials is harmless, and therefore
should not give rise to sanctions, and at the same time say that it is
wrongful and to be discouraged. But the Court in Butler does not
satisfactorily articulate the distinction between wrongfulness and
sanctionability. It does not say what makes some pornographic works
objectifying but in benign (or even positive) ways, what makes others
objectifying in pernicious ways, and what makes still others worthy of
punishment. As a result, the casual reader of Butler could be forgiven for
thinking that, so long as objectification is harmless in the narrow sense
articulated by Sopinka J., it is morally unproblematic.
This failure to distinguish between wrongfulness and sanctionability,
in turn, is tied to our present confusion about the role and value of
consent. Because Butler was concerned with the harms flowing from the
publication of obscene materials, and not mere possession, the Court
needed only to deal with the harms resulting to society. The reasoning
employed in Butler, though, was extended to offences of sexual indecency in which harm could conceivably be sustained not just by the
wider community, but by the participants themselves. This produced a
difficulty of its own. When our concern is the tendency of materials to
predispose viewers to adopt objectifying attitudes, the fact that the
participants appear to consent to the acts portrayed may make no
definitive difference: to see a woman treat herself as a sexual object may
only encourage viewers to think of her in that way as well. As Sopinka J.
observed in Butler, “[s]ometimes the very appearance of consent makes
the depicted acts even more degrading or dehumanizing.”45 Later, in
Little Sisters, Binnie J. made a similar remark in the course of rejecting

45

Butler, supra, note 12, at 479.
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claims that it would be inappropriate to apply the harm-based approach
endorsed in Butler to gay and lesbian pornography:
The potential of harm and a same-sex depiction are not necessarily
mutually exclusive. Portrayal of a dominatrix engaged in the nonviolent degradation of an ostensibly willing sex slave is no less
dehumanizing if the victim happens to be of the same sex, and no less
(and no more) harmful in its reassurance to the viewer that the victim
finds such conduct both normal and pleasurable.46

But if we think that consent is not necessarily capable of dignifying
sexual acts for viewers, then it is not clear why the presence of consent
should be determinative when assessing whether there is harm to
participants. If consent sometimes makes the acts in question more
degrading or dehumanizing, then the consent of the participant may give
us more reason to think that she is being harmed by engaging in them,
not less. That conclusion, though, would run up against the intuition that
respect for the autonomy of persons requires us to grant them a zone of
free choice within which they can consent even to acts that we think
damaging. Approaching the matter from the other direction, if there is no
harm in people treating themselves as sexual objects, then how can it be
harmful for others to see them as sexual objects, and to encourage them
to think of themselves in that way, so long as they obtain consent before
acting on their attitudes?
Butler had already quietly raised this problem in its discussion of the
artistic merit defence. Where the portrayal of sex — even degrading or
dehumanizing sex — justifiably advances a plot or theme in a work with
scientific, artistic or literary merit, the Court held that it cannot be
“undue” within the meaning of section 163(8). Justice Sopinka did not
suggest that such portrayals of sexual activity must become “harmless”
merely because they occur in the context of an artistic work. On the
contrary, it seems plain enough that the representations fall outside the
obscenity provisions in spite of the fact that they may yet predispose
others to anti-social attitudes. That suggests there is more going on in the
obscenity prohibition than the targeting of harm; that Parliament was
prepared to tolerate some harms for the sake of one or another competing
social value. Once we say that, we might think that autonomy, too, could
be just such a competing social value.

46
Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2000] S.C.J. No.
66, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1120, at para. 60 (S.C.C.) (emphasis added) [hereinafter “Little Sisters”].
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But we have seen that consent can matter in different ways. When
does it matter because it renders objectifying acts morally unproblematic,
and when does it serve to license (perhaps inadvisedly) acts that should
be discouraged? Without engaging in a more considered study of what
makes portrayed acts instrumentalizing, it is difficult to see just what
difference consent should make in particular cases. We can see this
confusion manifest itself in Labaye.

IV. LABAYE, FUNGIBILITY AND CONSENT
The reasoning in Butler was expressly relied upon by the majority in
Labaye. The accused in Labaye had operated a members-only club in
which couples and single people would meet each other for group sex.
He was charged with keeping a common bawdy-house for the practice of
acts of indecency. Ultimately, it fell to the Supreme Court to determine
the circumstances under which “indecent” acts could be regarded as
criminal behaviour. As we have seen, the majority concluded that
criminal indecency must involve harm of a kind and degree that is
incompatible with Charter values or other fundamental norms.47 Writing
for the majority, McLachlin C.J.C. suggested that conduct could be
criminally indecent where it produced one of three types of harm: “(1)
harm to those whose autonomy and liberty may be restricted by being
confronted with inappropriate conduct; (2) harm to society by predisposing others to anti-social conduct; [or] (3) harm to individuals participating in the conduct”.48 To be sure, the majority stressed that “other types
of harm may be shown in the future to meet the standards for criminality
established by Butler”.49 Nonetheless, the list is instructive for several
reasons.
First, conduct that is essentially private, the majority observed, will
generally not give rise to the first type of harm.50 So long as the public’s
exposure to the sexual acts in question is carefully controlled, as it
ostensibly was in Labaye,51 the majority found that they cannot harmfully confront them with inappropriate conduct. The mere fact that
members of the public, not exposed to the conduct in question, are

47
48
49
50
51

Labaye, supra, note 13, at para. 29.
Id., at para. 36.
Id.
Id., at paras. 42, 47.
Id., at para. 65.
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offended by the idea that it is happening somewhere, is not to be treated
as a harm warranting the criminal sanction.
The second and third harms are, for my purposes here, more interesting. Chief Justice McLachlin, citing Butler, observed: “The second
source of harm is based on the danger that the conduct or material may
predispose others to commit anti-social acts.”52 It is not necessary for the
Crown to show that the conduct or material in question expressly invites
or encourages people to engage in anti-social behaviour.53 It is enough
that the impugned conduct subtly influences the attitudes of members of
the public in such a way that they become more likely to think and act in
anti-social ways. Thus, the Chief Justice noted, the second type of harm
will be made out where the “[c]onduct or material ... perpetuates negative
and demeaning images of humanity [that are] likely to undermine respect
for members of ... targeted groups and hence to predispose others to act
in an anti-social manner towards them”.54
In Labaye, the majority quickly concluded that there was no conduct
taking place in the accused’s club that was capable of “predisposing
people to anti-social acts or attitudes”.55 Chief Justice McLachlin
remarked:
Unlike the material at issue in Butler, which perpetuated abusive and
humiliating stereotypes of women as objects of sexual gratification,
there is no evidence of anti-social attitudes towards women, or for that
matter men. No one was pressured to have sex, paid for sex, or treated
as a mere sexual object for the gratification of others. The fact that [the
club] is a commercial establishment does not in itself render the sexual
activities taking place there commercial in nature. Members do not pay
a fee and check consent at the door; the membership fee buys access to
a club where members can meet and engage in consensual activities
with other individuals who have similar sexual interests. The case
proceeded on the uncontested premise that all participation was on a
voluntary and equal basis.56

A few observations are worth making about this passage. First, the
touchstone for the majority appears to be whether the participants being
observed have been treated “as objects of sexual gratification”. Whether
the conduct in question is harmful turns, to no small extent, on simply
52
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whether the participants have objectified each other. That in itself
suggests that there was an opportunity to learn something about other
objectification offences from the Court’s reasoning in Labaye. The
second point is that, in considering whether the sexual activities in the
accused’s club are objectifying, McLachlin C.J.C. placed heavy emphasis
on the non-commercial nature of those activities. The mere fact that the
participants were not perceived to be paying one another for sex, or
engaged in purely financial transactions, was treated as an important
reason not to infer that an observer would think of them as sexual
objects. Third, the consensual nature of the activities was likewise
regarded as an important — perhaps overriding — factor when determining whether the conduct would have a negative impact on the attitudes of
observers. In the companion case, R. v. Kouri, the majority likewise put
the stress on the non-commercial and consensual nature of the sexual
activities in assessing whether the second kind of harm would result.57
With respect to the third category of harm, McLachlin C.J.C. again
made a number of intriguing remarks. First and foremost, she emphasized “physical or psychological” harm:58
A third source of harm is the risk of physical or psychological harm to
individuals involved in the conduct at issue. Sexual activity is a
positive source of human expression, fulfilment and pleasure. But some
kinds of sexual activity may harm those involved. Women may be
forced into prostitution or other aspects of the sex trade. They may be
the objects of physical and psychological assault. Sometimes they may
be seriously hurt or even killed. Similar harms may be perpetrated on
children and men. Sexual conduct that risks this sort of harm may
violate society’s declared norms in a way that is incompatible with the
proper functioning of society, and hence meet the Butler test for
indecent conduct under the Criminal Code.59

Strikingly, the majority places far less importance on the
(non-)commercial nature of the activity in this context than it did when
determining whether the second type of harm was imposed. Though
McLachlin C.J.C. refers to prostitution and the sex trade, she is talking
about the harms associated with being forced to provide sexual services
for money. There is no suggestion that one harms oneself by voluntarily
providing those services. This, we may suppose, is tied to a point that the
57
58
59

[2005] S.C.J. No. 82, 2005 SCC 81 (S.C.C.).
Labaye, supra, note 13, at para. 48.
Id.

332

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2012), 57 S.C.L.R. (2d)

majority made in the following passage: the presence of genuine (as
opposed to merely “apparent”) consent would “generally be significant
in considering whether this type of harm is established”.60 Where consent
exists, the majority seems to say, the objectifying nature of commercialized sexual practices becomes harmless — at least vis-à-vis the participants themselves. The significance of consent is hinted at in other aspects
of the indented quotation reproduced above. Chief Justice McLachlin
mentions the harm that might befall child participants, but of course
children would not be able to consent to sexual activities in the first
place. The Court in R. v. Jobidon made it clear that consent cannot be a
defence to certain kinds of assault; this can explain why the majority
emphasizes physical and psychological injury.61 Ideas of consent and
voluntariness take on overwhelming significance in the harm-to-self
analysis.
The Labaye majority’s treatment of harm is dissatisfying, not least
because it glosses over a number of considerations which one would
have thought obviously relevant to any discussion of objectification in
the sex club context. Recall Nussbaum’s observation that objectification
may manifest itself in an attitude towards others as “fungible” — as
interchangeable with other persons or inanimate objects.62 When we act
as though a woman’s unique personality or characteristics are irrelevant
— as if she is valuable only because she possesses characteristics shared
by any other woman — we at least risk suggesting that she is essentially
disposable. In an environment like the accused’s club in Labaye, where
relative strangers engaged in more or less anonymous sexual encounters,
it is open to us to wonder whether they have reduced each other to a set
of interchangeable body parts. Yet the majority in Labaye says nothing
about the problems of fungibility.
This is not to say that, had the Labaye majority addressed fungibility
head-on, it would necessarily have found anything morally problematic
with the sexual encounters taking place in the club. I have said that
treating others as fungible may entail disposability, but I would hesitate
to say that it must. To regard human beings as fungible might be to adopt
an equalizing or democratizing attitude; to see all persons as equally
worthy of respect insofar as they are all autonomous moral agents.63
Perhaps one can see others as fungible and yet celebrate the autonomy
60
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and personality of each of them. Something like this view has been
articulated by the “free love” movement, “swinger culture”, and by
writers who celebrate the bathhouse culture in the gay community.64
But this should not be accepted uncritically. Even if an attitude towards people as fungible is equalizing in the thin sense that it entails the
view that persons are more or less the same, we may chafe at the idea
that this is all that a commitment to equality requires. We may fear that
this is an empty equality, one that reduces human beings to the sum total
of their body parts, effacing their personalities, and stripping away
everything about them that imbues them with dignity.65 Addressing
Richard Mohr’s claim that gay bathhouse culture expresses a “democratic spirit”, Nussbaum remarked:
[T]he suspicion remains that there may after all be some connection
between the spirit of fungibility and a focus on ... superficial aspects of
race and class and penis size, which do in a sense dehumanize, and turn
people into potential instruments. For in the absence of any narrative
history with the person, how can desire attend to anything but the
incidental, and how can one do more than use the body of the other as a
tool of one’s own states?66

If these concerns resonate when we are talking about sexual relationships between people of the same gender, we should be all the more alert
to concerns of disposability — to the suggestion that people may be
consumed and discarded like so many junk food wrappers — when the
relationships are between men and women, with all the skewed power
dynamics they frequently entail. Again, my point is not that the sexual
activities at issue in Labaye were instrumentalizing, that they reduced
human beings to things to be used. It is that the majority in Labaye
missed an opportunity to say something important about what it means to
engage in objectification; that this was, we might say, a “teachable
moment” for Canadians about what gender equality is.
In some respects, the majority did indeed take up the challenge. The
suggestion that it could harm onlookers to watch commercialized sex —
to watch a person’s body and sexuality turned into a sellable commodity
— evokes Nussbaum’s point that one can objectify another person by
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treating her as property.67 But having said, in effect, that the commodification of another person’s body harms society by predisposing observers
to see others as ownable things, McLachlin C.J.C. failed to observe that
treating others as fungible can amount to treating them as if they are
disposable consumer goods. That being the case, what is the moral
difference between treating human beings as property, and treating them
as fungible?
Ultimately, the majority may have thought it unnecessary to engage
in a more careful and sustained analysis of objectification because it was
able to fall back on the consent of the participants. Insofar as we are
concerned about the harm of predisposing observers to engage in antisocial acts, the issue is presumably not the actual consent of participants,
but their apparent consent. The majority expressly observed that participants do not “check consent at the door”, meaning that they would need
to obtain consent from each sexual partner.68 It is worth remembering
that, in Ewanchuk, the Supreme Court held that the defence of honest but
mistaken belief in consent, in sexual assault cases, would not be available merely because consent was not expressly refused.69 That aspect of
Ewanchuk was grounded in the proposition that someone who takes
consent for granted possesses the mens rea for sexual assault; one shows
a minimum degree of respect for the autonomy of one’s partner by taking
active steps to elicit a clear statement of consent. In a context where
sexual activities are no longer private in the strict sense, the Labaye
majority may have proceeded on the basis that participants would take
special care to elicit express consent from each other and that it would be
apparent to observers.
But even if it was reasonable for the majority to proceed in that way,
it is not intuitively obvious that harm in the second sense would not
result. That people treat themselves as commodities to be bought and sold
may make an observer more dismissive of their autonomy and dignity,
not less — it may suggest (however wrongly) that consent ought to be an
easy thing to obtain, and that it is appropriate to exert social pressure on
women who do not readily provide it. Recall the remarks in both Butler
67
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and Little Sisters that the appearance of consent may make sexual acts
more, not less, degrading or dehumanizing.70 To make this point is not to
deny the importance of consent. Quite the contrary, it underscores just
what it is that often makes consent important — i.e., the fact that consent
often serves to license the use of oneself as an instrument, not to make it
something other than instrumentalizing. If our concern is not just to
ensure that men obtain consent from women, but to avoid objectifying
them in morally problematic ways in the first place, a mere focus on
consent will not suffice. We must make it clear that merely consensual
sexual conduct can still be wrongful, and that it should be discouraged,
even if it should not be subject to criminal sanctions in a liberal democratic society.
For a similar reason, the focus on consent in the majority’s analysis
of the third kind of harm is likewise wrong-headed. A respect for sexual
autonomy may require us to allow men and women to objectify themselves — and to consent to their objectification by others — to some
extent.71 It hardly follows from that modest premise that they should be
encouraged to think of themselves in base and degrading terms. If we
think that treating others as fungible is instrumentalizing at its core, and
as such is inconsistent with robust notions of equality, then it is surely
open to the courts to say so, even as it permits people to do what they
will.

V. CONCLUSION
The changes to sexual assault law over the past 30 years have been
part of a broader public conversation about what it means for women to
be treated as equals. That conversation is about more than harm and
consent. There is a simple reason for that: respect and dignity require
more than not causing women physical or psychological pain, more than
getting their permission to degrade them. The Charter was to some extent
a conversation-starter but, as Butler and Labaye suggest, we have trouble
knowing what to say about ideas of objectification and dignity once we
try to think beyond the bare minimum of human decency. In that spirit,
the Supreme Court might adopt a greater leadership role. To take equality
seriously — really seriously — we need all the help we can get.
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